Systems and methods for selecting a lateral movement strategy for a penetration testing campaign

ABSTRACT

Methods and systems for carrying out campaigns of penetration testing for discovering and reporting security vulnerabilities of a networked system, the networked system comprising a plurality of network nodes interconnected by one or more networks.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application gains priority from U.S. Provisional PatentApplication 62/546,569 filed on Aug. 17, 2017 and entitled “RandomlySelecting a Strategy in a Penetration Testing Campaign”. This patentapplication claims priority from U.S. patent application Ser. Nos.15/681,782 and 15/681,692, both of which were filed on Aug. 21, 2017 andentitled “Setting Up Penetration Testing Campaigns”, both of which claimthe benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/453,056 filedon Feb. 1, 2017 and the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent ApplicationNo. 62/451,850 filed on Jan. 30, 2017. U.S. patent application Ser. Nos.15/681,782 and 15/681,682, as well as U.S. Provisional Application Nos.62/546,569, 62/453,056 and 62/451,850 are all incorporated herein byreference in their entirety.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

There is currently a proliferation of organizational networked computingsystems. Every type of organization, be it a commercial company, auniversity, a bank, a government agency or a hospital, heavily relies onone or more networks interconnecting multiple computing nodes. Failuresof the networked computing system of an organization, or even of only aportion of it, might cause significant damage, up to completely shuttingdown all operations. Additionally, much of the data of the organization,if not all the data, exist somewhere on its networked computing system,including all confidential data comprising the “crown jewels” of theorganization, such as prices, details of customers, purchase orders,employees' salaries, technical formulas, etc. Loss of such data or leaksof such data to unauthorized external entities might be disastrous forthe organization.

Many organizational networks are connected to the Internet at leastthrough one network node, and consequently may be subject to attacks bycomputer hackers or by hostile adversaries. Quite often the newspapersreport incidents in which websites crashed, sensitive data was stolen,or service to customers was denied, where the failures were the resultsof hostile penetration into an organization's networked computingsystem.

Thus, many organizations invest a lot of efforts and costs in preventivemeans designed to protect their computing networks against potentialthreats. There are many defensive products offered in the marketclaiming to provide protection against one or more known modes ofattack, and many organizations arm themselves to the teeth with multipleproducts of this kind.

However, it is difficult to tell how effective such products really arein achieving their stated goals of blocking hostile attacks, andconsequently most CISOs (Computer Information Security Officers) willadmit (maybe only off the record), that they don't really know how wellthey can withstand an attack from a given adversary. The only way toreally know the strength and security of a system, is by trying toattack it as a real adversary would. This is known as red-teaming orpenetration testing (pen testing, in short), and is a very commonapproach that is even required by regulation in some developedcountries.

Penetration testing requires highly talented people to man the testingteam. Those people should be familiar with each and every publicly knownvulnerability and attacking method and should also have a very goodfamiliarity with networking techniques and multiple operating systemsimplementations. Such people are hard to find and therefore manyorganizations give up establishing their own penetration testing teamsand resort to hiring external expert consultants for carrying out thatrole (or completely give up penetration testing). However, externalconsultants are expensive and therefore are typically called in only forbrief periods separated by long intervals in which no penetrationtesting is carried out. This makes the penetration testing ineffective,as vulnerabilities caused by new attacks, that appear almost daily, arediscovered only months after becoming serious threats to theorganization.

Additionally, even rich organizations that can afford hiring talentedexperts for in-house penetration testing teams do not achieve goodprotection. Testing for vulnerabilities of a large network containingmany types of computers, operating systems, network routers and otherdevices is both a very complex and a very tedious process. The processis prone to human errors such as missing testing for certain threats ormisinterpreting the damages of certain attacks. Additionally, because aprocess of full testing against all threats is quite long, theorganization might again end with a too long discovery period after anew threat appears.

In view of the above deficiencies, automated penetration testingsolutions were introduced in recent years by several vendors. Theseautomated solutions reduce human involvement in the penetration testingprocess, or at least in some of its functions.

A penetration testing process involves at least the following mainfunctions: (i) a reconnaissance function, (ii) an attack function, and(iii) a reporting function. The process may also include additionalfunctions, for example a cleanup function that restores the testednetworked system to its original state as it was before the test. In anautomated penetration testing system, at least one of the above threefunctions is at least partially automated, and typically two or three ofthem are at least partially automated.

A reconnaissance function is the function within a penetration testingsystem that handles the collection of data about the tested networkedsystem. The collected data may include internal data of networks nodes,data about network traffic within the tested networked system, businessintelligence data of the organization owning the tested networkedsystem, etc. The functionality of a prior art reconnaissance functioncan be implemented, for example, by software executing in a server thatis not one of the network nodes of the tested networked system, wherethe server probes the tested networked system for the purpose ofcollecting data about it.

An attack function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the determination of whether security vulnerabilities existin the tested networked system based on data collected by thereconnaissance function. The functionality of a prior art attackfunction can be implemented, for example, by software executing in aserver that is not one of the nodes of the tested networked system,where the server attempts to attack the tested networked system for thepurpose of verifying that it can be compromised.

A reporting function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the reporting of results of the penetration testing system.The functionality of a prior art reporting function may be implemented,for example, by software executing in the same server that executes thefunctionality of the attack function, where the server reports thefindings of the attack function to an administrator or a CISO of thetested networked system.

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system. FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a related flow-chart.

In FIG. 1A, code for the reconnaissance function, for the attackfunction, and for the reporting function are respectively labelled as20, 30 and 40, and are each schematically illustrated as part of apenetration testing system code module (PTSCM) labelled as 10. The term‘code’ is intended broadly and may include any combination ofcomputer-executable code and computer-readable data which when readaffects the output of execution of the code. The computer-executablecode may be provided as any combination of human-readable code (e.g. ina scripting language such as Python), machine language code, assemblercode and byte code, or in any form known in the art. Furthermore, theexecutable code may include any stored data (e.g. structured data) suchas configuration files, XML files, and data residing in any type ofdatabase (e.g. a relational database, an object-database, etc.).

In one example and as shown in FIG. 1B, the reconnaissance function(performed in step S21 by execution of reconnaissance function code 20),the attack function (performed in step S31 by execution of attackfunction code 30) and the reporting function (performed in step S41 byexecution of reporting function code 40) are executed in strictlysequential order so that first the reconnaissance function is performedby executing code 20 thereof, then the attack function is performed byexecuting code 30 thereof, and finally the reporting function isperformed 40 by executing code thereof.

However, the skilled artisan will appreciate that this order is just oneexample, and is not a requirement. For example, the attack and thereporting functions may be performed in parallel or in an interleavedway, with the reporting function reporting first results obtained by theattack function, while the attack function is working on additionalresults.

Similarly, the reconnaissance and the attack functions may operate inparallel or in an interleaved way, with the attack function detecting avulnerability based on first data collected by the reconnaissancefunction, while the reconnaissance function is working on collectingadditional data.

FIG. 1A also illustrates code of an optional cleanup function which islabeled as 50. Also illustrated in FIG. 1B is step S51 of performing acleanup function e.g. by cleanup function code 50 of FIG. 1A.

“A campaign of penetration testing” is a specific run of a specific testof a specific networked system by the penetration testing system.

A penetration-testing-campaign module may comprise at least part ofreconnaissance function code 20, attack function code 30 and optionallycleanup function code 50—for example, in combination with suitablehardware (e.g. one or more computing device(s) 110 and one or moreprocessor(s) 120 thereof, see FIG. 2) for executing the code.

FIG. 2 illustrates a prior art computing device 110 which may have anyform-factor including but not limited to a laptop, a desktop, a mobilephone, a server, a tablet, or any other form factor. The computingdevice 110 in FIG. 2 includes (i) computer memory 160 which may storecode 180; (ii) one or more processors 120 (e.g. central-processing-unit(CPU)) for executing code 180; (iii) one or more human-interfacedevice(s) 140 (e.g. mouse, keyboard, touchscreen, gesture-detectingapparatus including a camera, etc.) or an interface (e.g. USB interface)to receive input from a human-interface device; (iv) a display device130 (e.g. computer screen) or an interface (e.g. HDMI interface, USBinterface) for exporting video to a display device and (v) a networkinterface 150 (e.g. a network card, or a wireless modem).

Memory 160 may include any combination of volatile (e.g. RAM) andnon-volatile (e.g. ROM, flash, disk-drive) memory. Code 180 may includeoperating-system code—e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Android®, Mac-OS®.

Computing device 110 may include a user-interface for receiving inputfrom a user (e.g. manual input, visual input, audio input, or input inany other form) and for visually displaying output. The user-interface(e.g. graphical user interface (GUI)) of computing device 110 may thusinclude the combination of HID device 140 or an interface thereof (i.e.in communication with an external HID device 140), display device 130 oran interface thereof (i.e. in communication with an external displaydevice), and user-interface (UI) code stored in memory 160 and executedby one or more processor(s) 120. The user-interface may include one ormore GUI widgets such as labels, buttons (e.g. radio buttons or checkboxes), sliders, spinners, icons, windows, panels, text boxes, and thelike.

In one example, a penetration testing system is the combination of (i)code 10 (e.g. including reconnaissance function code 20, attack functioncode 30, reporting function code 40, and optionally cleaning functioncode 50); and (ii) one or more computing devices 110 which execute thecode 10. For example, a first computing device may execute a firstportion of code 10 and a second computing device (e.g. in networkedcommunication with the first computing device) may execute a secondportion of code 10.

Penetration testing systems may employ different types of architectures,each having its advantages and disadvantages. Examples are actual attackpenetration testing systems, simulated penetration testing systems andreconnaissance agent penetration testing systems. See the Definitionssection for more details about these types of penetration testingsystems.

THE PROBLEM TO SOLVE

When a user desires to operate a prior art penetration testing systemfor running a test on a specific networked system, the penetrationtesting system must know what test it should execute. For example, thepenetration testing system must know what is the type of attackeragainst whom the test is making its assessment (a state-sponsored actor,a cyber-criminal etc.), and what are his capabilities. As anotherexample, the penetration testing system must know what is the goal ofthe attacker according to which the attack will be judged as a successor a failure (copying a specific file and exporting it out of the testednetworked system, encoding a specific directory of a specific networknode for ransom, etc.).

A specific run of a specific test of a specific networked system by apenetration testing system is called a “campaign” of that penetrationtesting system, as defined hereinbelow in ‘q’ of the ‘Definitions’section. A collection of values for all information items a penetrationtesting system must know before executing a campaign is called“specifications of the campaign” or “scenario”, as defined hereinbelowin ‘v’ of the ‘Definitions’ section. For example, the type of theattacker and the goal of the attacker are specific information items ofa campaign, and specific values for them are parts of the specificationsof any campaign.

One special information item of a campaign is the lateral movementstrategy of the attacker during the campaign.

The lateral movement strategy of an attacker is the decision logicapplied by the attacker of a campaign for selecting the next networknode to try to compromise. During a penetration testing campaign, it isassumed that the attacker makes progress by an iterative process,wherein in each iteration the attacker selects the next node to attack,based on the group of network nodes that are already compromised andcontrolled by the attacker. If the attack on the selected node issuccessful, that node is added to the group of nodes that are alreadycompromised, and another iteration begins. If the attempt to compromisethe selected node fails, another node is selected, either according tosome other rule or randomly.

All types of penetration testing systems, whether using simulatedpenetration testing, actual attack penetration testing or some otherform of penetration testing, must use a lateral movement strategy. Inpenetration testing systems that actually attack the tested networkedsystem, the lateral movement strategy selects the path of attackactually taken through the networked system. In penetration testingsystems that simulate or evaluate the results of attacking the testednetworked system, the lateral movement strategy selects the path ofattack taken in the simulation or the evaluation through the networkedsystem. Therefore, in the above explanation, the term “attack” should beunderstood to mean “actual attack or simulated attack”, the term“already controls” should be understood to mean “already controls oralready determined to be able to control”, the term “alreadycompromised” should be understood to mean “already compromised oralready determined to be compromisable”, etc.

A simple example of a lateral movement strategy is a “depth first”strategy in which the next network node to attempt to compromise is anetwork node that is not yet compromised and is an immediate neighbor ofthe last network node that was compromised, provided such neighbor nodeexists. Two network nodes are “immediate neighbors” of each other if andonly if they have a direct communication link between them that does notpass through any other network node.

Another simple example is a “breadth search” strategy, in which the nextnetwork node to attempt to compromise is a network node that is not yetcompromised and whose distance from the first node compromised by thecampaign is the smallest possible. The distance between two networknodes is the number of network nodes along the shortest path betweenthem, plus one. A path is an ordered list of network nodes in which eachpair of adjacent nodes in the list is a pair of immediate neighbors.Thus, the distance between two immediate neighbors is one.

An example of a more advanced lateral movement strategy is a strategythat is applicable when a goal of the attacker is related to a resourceof the networked system that resides in a specific network node. In suchcase, the next network node to try to compromise may be selected bydetermining the shortest path in the networked system leading from analready compromised node to the specific node containing the desiredresource, and selecting the first node on the determined path as thenext node to attempt to compromise. If the shortest path has a length ofone, which occurs when the specific node is an immediate neighbor of analready compromised node, then the next node to attempt to compromise isthe specific node containing the desired resource.

Another example of a lateral movement strategy is a strategy that givespriority to network nodes satisfying a specific condition, for examplenodes that are known to have a specific weakness, such as running theWindows XP operating system. In such case, the next node to attempt tocompromise is a node that satisfies the condition and is an immediateneighbor of an already compromised node, if such a node exists.

In prior art penetration testing systems, an attacker can only have asingle lateral movement strategy, which may be (i) selected by thedesigner of the penetration testing system and cannot be changed at all,(ii) selected by the penetration testing system at runtime, for exampleaccording to the type of attacker selected for the current campaign andcannot be changed by the user, or (iii) selected by the user, whenconfiguring the campaign.

The lateral movement strategy used during a campaign may impact theresults of the campaign. At a given decision point, a first strategy maylead to picking one network node to be the next node to attack, while asecond strategy may lead to picking another network node to be the nextnode to attack. This distinction may then create a broader and broaderdifference between running the campaign using the first strategy andrunning it using the second strategy. If the key to conquering thetested networked system is compromising a specific administrator node,one strategy may be “lucky” and attack that specific node early in thecampaign, while the other node may be “unlucky” and waste a lot of timeattempting to break into many unimportant nodes before finally reachingthe specific administrator node. Thus, the choice of strategy mightsignificantly affect the length of time required for the penetrationtesting system to compromise the specific node and/or the testednetwork.

While the previous example demonstrates a difference in execution time,in this example both strategies eventually produce the same result.However, this is not always the case. Real-world organizations may havethousands and even tens of thousands of network nodes. Exhaustivelytesting such huge network until each node is compromised and controlledby the attacker is practically impossible because of the amount of timethis might require. Therefore, penetration testing campaigns aretypically provided with a time limit for their execution, which may bean hour or a day, or some other duration of a similar magnitude.

If a time-limited campaign is executed with each of the two strategiesdescribed above, the outcome might be such that with one strategy theresult of the test is a successful compromising of the tested network,while with the other strategy the result is a failure in compromisingthe network because of aborting the test when hitting the time limit. Inthe last case, the results presented to the operator of the penetrationtesting system will be misleading—the report will say the penetrationattempt failed and the system is safe, while in reality this is not thecase.

This situation is clearly undesirable and should be remedied.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Some embodiments of the invention relate to methods and systems forcarrying out automated penetration testing, in which a lateral movementstrategy for a penetration testing campaign is randomly selected.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the invention, there isprovided a method of penetration testing of a networked system by apenetration testing system that is controlled by a user interface of acomputing device so that a penetration testing campaign is executedaccording to a lateral movement strategy of an attacker of thepenetration testing campaign, the method including:

-   -   a. automatically selecting, by the penetration testing system,        one lateral movement strategy from a group of multiple lateral        movement strategies available for use in the penetration testing        campaign, wherein the automatic selecting is done by randomly        selecting the one lateral movement strategy from the group of        lateral movement strategies;    -   b. executing the penetration testing campaign, by the        penetration testing system and according to the automatically        selected lateral movement strategy of the attacker, so as to        test the networked system; and    -   c. reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one        security vulnerability determined to exist in the networked        system by the executing of the penetration testing campaign,        wherein the reporting includes at least one of (i) causing a        display device to display a report describing the at least one        security vulnerability, (ii) storing the report describing the        at least one security vulnerability in a file, and (iii)        electronically transmitting the report describing the at least        one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the executing of the penetration testing campaignincludes at least one event of selecting, according to the automaticallyselected one lateral movement strategy, a network node of the networkedsystem to be the next network node to be attacked by the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the method further includes: prior to theautomatically selecting, receiving, by the penetration testing systemand via the user interface of the computing device, one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to make the automatic selection randomly.

In some embodiments, the method further includes, prior to theautomatically selecting, determining, by the penetration testing system,the group of multiple lateral movement strategies that are available foruse in the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the determining of the group of multiple lateralmovement strategies includes retrieving the group of multiple lateralmovement strategies from a non-volatile storage device functionallyaccessible to the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the determining of the group of multiple lateralmovement strategies includes:

-   -   a. displaying, by the penetration testing system, a second group        of multiple lateral movement strategies, the second group of        multiple lateral movement strategies including the lateral        movement strategies in the group of multiple lateral movement        strategies;    -   b. receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the user        interface of the computing device, one or more manually-entered        inputs explicitly selecting a sub-group of the second group of        multiple lateral movement strategies;    -   c. defining the group of multiple lateral movement strategies        from which the one lateral movement strategy is automatically        selected to be the selected sub-group.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the invention, there isprovided a system for penetration testing of a networked system byperforming a penetration testing campaign against the networked system,the system including:

-   -   a. a set-up module including:        -   i. one or more set-up processors; and        -   ii. a set-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium            for instructions execution by the one or more set-up            processors, the set-up non-transitory computer readable            storage medium having stored instructions to automatically            select one lateral movement strategy of an attacker of the            penetration testing campaign from a group of multiple            lateral movement strategies available for use in the            penetration testing campaign, the instructions to            automatically select including instructions to randomly            select the one lateral movement strategy from the group of            lateral movement strategies;    -   b. a penetration-testing-campaign module including:        -   i. one or more penetration-testing-campaign processors; and        -   ii. a penetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer            readable storage medium for instructions execution by the            one or more penetration-testing-campaign processors, the            penetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer            readable storage medium having stored instructions to            perform the penetration testing campaign according to the            automatically selected lateral movement strategy of the            attacker so as to test the networked system; and    -   c. a reporting module including:        -   i. one or more reporting processors; and        -   ii. a reporting non-transitory computer readable storage            medium for instructions execution by the one or more            reporting processors, the reporting non-transitory computer            readable storage medium having stored instructions to report            at least one security vulnerability determined to exist in            the networked system according to results of the penetration            testing campaign performed by the            penetration-testing-campaign module, the instructions to            report including at least one of (i) instructions to cause a            display device to display a report describing the at least            one security vulnerability, (ii) instructions to store the            report describing the at least one security vulnerability in            a file and (iii) instructions to electronically transmit the            report describing the at least one security vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the instructions to perform the penetration testingcampaign include instructions to select, according to the automaticallyselected one lateral movement strategy, a network node of the networkedsystem to be the next network node to be attacked by the attacker of thepenetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the set-up non-transitory computer readable storagemedium further includes stored instructions, to be carried out prior tocarrying out of the instructions to automatically: select, to receive,via a user interface associated with the set-up module, one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to make the automatic selection randomly.

In some embodiments, the set-up non-transitory computer readable storagemedium further includes stored instructions, to be carried out prior tocarrying out of the instructions to automatically select, to determinethe group of multiple lateral movement strategies that are available foruse in the penetration testing campaign.

In some embodiments, the instructions to determine the group of multiplelateral movement strategies include instructions to retrieve the groupof multiple lateral movement strategies from a non-volatile storagedevice functionally accessible to the set-up module.

In some embodiments, (i) the set-up module is functionally associatedwith a user interface, and (ii) the instructions to determine the groupof multiple lateral movement strategies include:

-   -   a. instructions to display, by the set-up module and via the        user interface, a second group of multiple lateral movement        strategies, the second group of multiple lateral movement        strategies including the lateral movement strategies in the        group of multiple lateral movement strategies;    -   b. instructions to receive, by the set-up module and via the        user interface, one or more manually-entered inputs explicitly        selecting a sub-group of the second group of multiple lateral        movement strategies; and    -   c. instructions to define the group of multiple lateral movement        strategies from which the one lateral movement strategy is        automatically selected to be the selected sub-group.

Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used hereinhave the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill inthe art to which the invention pertains, unless explicitly defined inthis application. In case of conflict, the specification, includingdefinitions, will take precedence.

As used herein, the terms “comprising”, “including”, “having” andgrammatical variants thereof are to be taken as specifying the statedfeatures, integers, steps or components but do not preclude the additionof one or more additional features, integers, steps, components orgroups thereof. These terms encompass the terms “consisting of” and“consisting essentially of”.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The invention is herein described; by way of example only, withreference to the accompanying drawings. With specific reference now tothe drawings in detail, it is stressed that the particulars shown are byway of example and for purposes of illustrative discussion of thepreferred embodiments of the present invention only, and are presentedin the cause of providing what is believed to be the most useful andreadily understood description of the principles and conceptual aspectsof the invention. In this regard, no attempt is made to show structuraldetails of the invention in more detail than is necessary for afundamental understanding of the invention, the description taken withthe drawings making apparent to those skilled in the art how the severalforms of the invention may be embodied in practice. Throughout thedrawings, like-referenced characters are used to designate likeelements.

In the drawings:

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system;

FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a flow-chart related to the system of FIG. 1A;

FIG. 2 (PRIOR ART) illustrates a prior art computing device;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a penetration testing system according toan embodiment of the invention;

FIGS. 4A and 4B together are a flow chart of a method for penetrationtesting of a networked system according to an embodiment of theinvention;

FIG. 5 illustrates a first example of user engagements of a userinterface according to an embodiment of the invention; and

FIG. 6 illustrates a second example of user engagements of a userinterface according to an embodiment of the invention.

DESCRIPTION OF SOME EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

The invention, in some embodiments, relates to penetration testing of anetworked system, and specifically to randomly selecting a lateralmovement strategy of a penetration testing campaign.

The present disclosure should be interpreted according to thedefinitions in the “Definitions Section” at the end of thespecification. In case of a contradiction between the definitions in the“Definitions Section” at the end of the specification and other sectionsof this disclosure, the “Definitions Section” at the end of thespecification section should prevail.

In case of a contradiction between the “Definitions Section” at the endof the specification and a definition or a description in any otherdocument, including in another document incorporated in this disclosureby reference, the “Definitions Section” at the end of the specificationshould prevail, even if the definition or the description in the otherdocument is commonly accepted by a person of ordinary skill in the art.

The present invention provides a solution to the challenges discussedhereinabove with respect to the prior art, and specifically provides apenetration testing system that randomly selects a lateral movementstrategy for the attacker of a penetration testing campaign.

In a first embodiment, the penetration testing system automatically andrandomly selects the lateral movement strategy before or at the time ofinitiating a campaign, such that the user takes no part in theselection. The selection is a random selection from a list of availablestrategies. The strategy randomly selected from the list is used formaking the node selection decision at each step or iteration during thepenetration testing campaign in which the next node to attack has to beselected.

In accordance with the first embodiment, it is advisable to run multiplecampaigns using the same scenario, i.e. the same specifications forexecuting the multiple campaigns. Because of the randomization of thelateral movement strategy, it is most probable that different runs ofthe scenario will use different lateral movement strategies. Whenrunning multiple campaigns using the same scenario, the randomization ofstrategies makes it much less likely that a damaging vulnerability insome network node will escape detection. This is in contrast with theprior art penetration testing systems, which, when executing the samescenario several times, always use the same lateral movement strategyand therefore are expected to always get the same results.

In a second embodiment, the user is given a role in controlling therandom selection of the strategies. The user manually activates anddeactivates an operating mode in which randomization of strategies isenabled. While that operating mode is active, for every campaign thepenetration testing system randomly selects a lateral movement strategyfrom a list of available strategies.

Optionally, in addition to activating the strategies randomizationoperating mode, the user may also select which of the strategiesgenerally available to the penetration testing system will be availableto the system for selection in the next campaign(s). For example, theuser may be presented with an array of multiple check-boxes, eachcorresponding to one available strategy. If the user selects only one ofthe check-boxes, then the corresponding strategy is forced by the userand will be used in the campaign with no random factor. If, however, theuser selects multiple check-boxes, or all the check-boxes, the systemmakes a random selection from the subset of strategies whose check-boxeswere selected by the user. Thus, the user has an option for limiting theautomatic random selection by the system by eliminating strategies thathe does not want the system to use.

In an alternative embodiment, instead of the penetration testing systemautomatically and randomly selecting a lateral movement strategy once,before or at the time of starting the campaign, the system makes anindependent automatic and random selection of a lateral movementstrategy each time it is required to select the next network node toattempt to compromise. Thus, the selection of one node is carried outusing one strategy, while the selection of the next node may be carriedout using another strategy. In this embodiment, there is practically no“pure strategy” guiding the overall movement in the networked system,because the decision rules might not be consistent from one iteration toanother. This results in a “chaotic strategy” that may be desirable forensuring that vulnerabilities in the tested networked system are notmissed because of some deficiencies in each of the available strategies.

In a variation of this embodiment, the user manually activates anddeactivates an operating mode in which randomization of strategies isindependently enabled for the selection of each node during thecampaign, and the penetration testing system randomly and independentlyselects a strategy for each move.

Optionally, the user not only activates the operating mode in whichstrategies are randomized, but may also select which of the pre-definedstrategies will be available for the system to select from at each nodeselection point. The implementation of the user interface for this casemay be similar to the one described for the second embodiment above.

Reference is now made to FIG. 3, which is a block diagram of apenetration testing system 200 according to an embodiment of theinvention.

As seen in FIG. 3, the penetration testing system 200 includes a set-upmodule 210, adapted for setting up a penetration testing campaign. Theset-up module 210 may include one or more set-up processors 212, and aset-up memory 214, such as a non-transitory computer readable storagemedium, having stored thereon instructions to be executed by the one ormore set-up processors 212. In some embodiments, the set-up memory 214has stored instructions to automatically select one lateral movementstrategy of an attacker of the penetration testing campaign from a groupof multiple lateral movement strategies available for use in thepenetration testing campaign. The instructions to automatically selectthe strategy include instructions to randomly select the lateralmovement strategy from the group of available lateral movementstrategies.

System 200 further includes a penetration-testing-campaign module 220,functionally associated with set-up module 210 and including one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors 222 and apenetration-testing-campaign memory 224, such as a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium, having stored thereon instructions tobe executed by the one or more penetration-testing-campaign processors222. The memory 224 has stored instructions to perform a penetrationtesting campaign according to the randomly and automatically selectedlateral movement strategy of the attacker, so as to test the networkedsystem.

In some embodiments, the instructions to perform the penetration testingcampaign also include instructions to select, according to theautomatically selected one lateral movement strategy, a network node ofthe networked system to be the next network node to be attacked by theattacker of the penetration testing campaign.

A reporting module 230 is functionally associated with a user interface240 and with penetration-testing-campaign module 220. Reporting module230 includes one or more reporting processors 232, and a reportingmemory 234, such as a non-transitory computer readable storage medium,having stored thereon instructions to be executed by the one or morereporting processors 232. The reporting memory 234 has storedinstructions to report at least one security vulnerability detected ordetermined to exist in the networked system according to results of thepenetration testing campaign performed by penetration-testing-campaignmodule 220. The instructions to report include at least one of:

(i) instructions to cause a display device (e.g. of user interface 240or another display device, which may be located remotely to thereporting module 230) to display a report describing the detectedsecurity vulnerability;

(ii) instructions to store the report describing the detected securityvulnerability in a file; and

(iii) instructions to electronically transmit the report describing thedetected security vulnerability, for example using a transceiver 236functionally associated with the reporting module 230.

In some embodiments, set-up memory 214 further has stored instructionsto determine the group of multiple lateral movement strategies that areavailable for use in the penetration testing campaign, whichinstructions are to be carried out prior to carrying out theinstructions to automatically select a lateral movement strategy.

In some embodiments, the instructions to determine the group of multiplelateral movement strategies comprise instructions to retrieve the groupof multiple lateral movement strategies from a non-volatile storagedevice functionally accessible to the set-up module.

In some embodiments, the set-up module 210 is functionally associatedwith the user interface 240, and the user interface 240 may include oneor more user interface components 242 for manual and explicit definitionof the group of lateral movement strategies available for selection bythe set-up module 210.

In some such embodiments, the instructions to determine the group ofmultiple lateral movement strategies comprise:

-   -   a. instructions to display, by the set-up module 210 and via the        user interface 240, a second group of multiple lateral movement        strategies, the second group of multiple lateral movement        strategies including the lateral movement strategies in the        group of multiple lateral movement strategies;    -   b. instructions to receive, by the set-up module 210 and via the        user interface 240, one or more manually-entered inputs        explicitly selecting a sub-group of the second group of multiple        lateral movement strategies; and    -   c. instructions to define the group of multiple lateral movement        strategies from which the one lateral movement strategy is        automatically selected to be the selected sub-group.

In some embodiments, set-up memory 214 further has stored instructionsto receive, via the user interface 240, one or more manually enteredinputs explicitly instructing the penetration testing system to make theautomatic selection of the lateral movement strategy randomly, whichinstructions are to be carried out prior to carrying out theinstructions to automatically select a lateral movement strategy.

In some embodiments, system 200 further includes a reconnaissance module250 adapted to carry out a reconnaissance function, an attack module 255adapted to carry out an attack function, and/or a cleanup module 260adapted to carry out a cleanup function as described hereinabove. Thepenetration-testing-campaign module 220 may include at least part of thereconnaissance module 250 carrying out reconnaissance function code, theattack module 255 carrying out the attack function code, and/or thecleanup module 260 carrying out cleanup function code.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign memory 224,reporting memory 234, and set-up memory 214 are each a dedicated, andseparate, memory component or storage medium. In other embodiments, atleast two of the penetration-testing-campaign memory 224, reportingmemory 234, and set-up memory 214 may be part of the same memorycomponent or storage medium.

In some embodiments, the set-up processor(s) 212,penetration-testing-campaign processor(s) 222, and reportingprocessor(s) 232 are each dedicated, and separate, processors. In otherembodiments, at least two of the set-up processor(s) 212,penetration-testing-campaign processor(s) 222, and reportingprocessor(s) 232 share at least one common processor.

FIGS. 4A and 4B, together, are a flow-chart of a method of penetrationtesting of a networked system by a penetration testing system accordingto an automatically and randomly selected lateral movement strategy.

In step S300 of FIG. 4B, the penetration testing system automaticallyselects one lateral movement strategy from a group of multiple lateralmovement strategies available for use in the penetration testingcampaign, by randomly selecting the one lateral movement strategy fromthe group of lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the selection of step S300 is carried out prior to,or at the time of, initiating the penetration testing campaign, and isapplicable to all lateral movement steps within the campaign.

In step S302 the penetration testing campaign is executed by thepenetration testing system, for example by penetration-testing-campaignmodule 220 of FIG. 3, so as to test the networked system. Execution ofthe penetration testing campaign includes selecting the next networknode to be attacked or to attempt to compromise, according to therandomly and automatically selected lateral movement strategy.

Following termination or completion of the penetration testing campaign,at step S304 the penetration testing system reports at least onesecurity vulnerability determined to exist in the networked system bythe execution of the penetration testing campaign, for example byreporting module 230 of FIG. 3. The reporting comprises at least one of:

-   -   (i) causing a display device to display a report describing the        security vulnerability,    -   (ii) storing the report describing the security vulnerability in        a file, and    -   (iii) electronically transmitting (e.g. over a computer network)        a report describing the security vulnerability.

In one example, in which the reporting at step S304 comprises causing adisplay device to display a report describing the securityvulnerability, a computing device that performs the reporting causes alocal display device (e.g. either residing in a common housing with thecomputing device that performs the reporting or connected via a localdevice interface) to display the report.

Alternatively or additionally, data describing the report may be sent toanother computing device (e.g. in communication with the computingdevice that performs the reporting via a local or remote network) tocause the other computing device to display the report on a displaydevice local to the other computing device or to store it in a storagedevice for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory ofthe computing device that performs the reporting, and the reporting stepmay be completed only after some delay (e.g. even a delay of weeks ormonths or years).

In some embodiments, a step S310 may precede step S300, as seen in FIG.4A. In step S310 the penetration testing system receives one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to make the automatic selection randomly. The inputs may beprovided by the user via a user interface, such as user interface 240 ofFIG. 3. An example of step S310 is described hereinbelow with referenceto FIG. 5.

In some embodiments, prior to step S300, the group of lateral movementstrategies available for selection by the penetration testing system isdetermined at step S312, as seen in FIG. 4A.

In some such embodiments, such determination is carried out by stepS314, in which the group of multiple lateral movement strategies isretrieved, by the penetration testing system, from a non-volatilestorage device functionally accessible to the penetration testingsystem.

In other embodiments, the determination of the group is carried out by auser. In such embodiments, in step S316, the penetration testing systemdisplays to the user, for example via user interface 240 of FIG. 3, asecond group of multiple lateral movement strategies, which includes thelateral movement strategies in the group of multiple lateral movementstrategies. Subsequently, in step S318, the penetration testing systemreceives one or more manually-entered inputs explicitly selecting asub-group of the second group of multiple lateral movement strategies.For example, the inputs may be provided via user interface 240 of FIG.3. In step S320 the group of multiple lateral movement strategies fromwhich the one lateral movement strategy is automatically selected isdefined to be the selected sub-group.

Specific examples of step S312 are discussed below with reference toFIG. 6.

Reference is now made to FIG. 5, which illustrates a first example ofuser engagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to randomly select the lateral movement strategy, as disclosed instep S310 of FIG. 4A.

In a first example presented in FIG. 5, a GUI element 400 allows theuser to manually and explicitly select between manual definition of aspecific lateral movement strategy, which is not random, and automaticrandom selection of the lateral movement strategy. In the embodimentillustrated in FIG. 5, the user may select whether the lateral movementstrategy should be automatically determined at random using a firstradio button 402, or manually using a second radio button 404.

FIG. 5 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 5, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—this relates to a user engagement of a GUI element.For example, the user provides a mouse click (e.g. depressing a mousebutton) when a mouse pointer is located in a specific location of theGUI element. The skilled artisan will appreciate that a mouse click isjust one example of a user engagement of a GUI element or portionthereof. In another example, a mouse-pointer points to an elementwithout any need for a mouse-click; in another example, a user toucheswith his or her finger (or with a stylus) a GUI element for ‘userengagement’.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated embodiment, thedefault value is for the lateral movement strategy to be selectedmanually, and as such, in Frame 1, radio button 404 is selected.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects to have the lateral movementstrategy be selected at random e.g. the user engagement of radio button402 of GUI element 400 may be provided by a mouse-click.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘begin’ button 406 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click, therebytriggering steps S300 to S304 of the method of FIG. 49.

Reference is now made to FIG. 6, which illustrates a second example ofuser engagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly identifying which of the availablelateral movement strategies will be available for automatic and randomselection by the penetration testing system in the next campaign(s), asdisclosed in steps S316-S320 of FIG. 4A.

In the example presented in FIG. 6, a GUI element 500 allows the user tomanually and explicitly select lateral movement strategies which will beavailable for selection by the penetration testing system when randomlyselecting a lateral movement strategy for the next campaign(s). In theembodiment illustrated in FIG. 6, the user may select one or more ofpre-defined available lateral movement strategies using one or morecheckboxes 502.

FIG. 6 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 6, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—this relates to a user engagement of a GUI element, asdescribed hereinabove with respect to FIG. 5.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated embodiment, thedefault value is for the lateral movement strategy to be based on thebreadth first search (BFS) algorithm, and as such, in Frame 1, thecheckbox 502 a indicating BFS is selected.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects specific lateral movementstrategies to be available for automatic and random selection by thepenetration testing system (for example when executing step S300 of themethod of FIG. 4B)—e.g. the user engagement of checkboxes 502 of GUIelement 500 may be provided by mouse-clicks. The user may choose tounselect the default selection, or to keep the default selection and addto it additional lateral movement strategies by selecting additionalcheckboxes. In the illustrated embodiment, the user has kept the defaultselection of BFS, and has additionally selected three other lateralmovement strategies by user engagement of the checkboxes 502 thereof.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘begin’ button 506 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click, therebytriggering steps S300 to S304 of the method of FIG. 4B, where the groupof lateral movement strategies available for the penetration testingsystem at step S300 are those whose corresponding check-boxes wereselected at time t3.

In some embodiments, the user interface is programmed such that the useris required to select more than one lateral movement strategy, in orderto facilitate automatic and random selection by the system. In some suchembodiments, Frame 2 may include a message prompting the user to selectat least two lateral movement strategies. In some such embodiments, userengagement with ‘begin’ button 506 may be blocked or prevented, untilthe user selects two or more lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 6 may occurimmediately after the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 5. Forexample, if in FIG. 5 the user clicks radio button 402 indicating thatthe lateral movement strategy should be selected at random, the userinterface may then present the user with the list of checkboxes 502 ofFIG. 6, for the user to determine the list of lateral movementstrategies available for such random selection.

DEFINITIONS

This disclosure should be interpreted according to the definitionsbelow. In case of a contradiction between the definitions in thisDefinitions section and other sections of this disclosure, this sectionshould prevail.

In case of a contradiction between the definitions in this section and adefinition or a description in any other document, including in anotherdocument included in this disclosure by reference, this section shouldprevail, even if the definition or the description in the other documentis commonly accepted by a person of ordinary skill in the art.

-   -   a. “computing device”—Any device having a processing unit into        which it is possible to install code that can be executed by the        processing unit. The installation of the code may be possible        even while the device is operative in the field or it may be        possible only in the factory.    -   b. “peripheral device”—Any device, whether a computing device or        not, that provides input or output services to at least one        other device that is a computing device. Examples of peripheral        devices are printers, plotters, scanners, environmental sensors,        smart-home controllers, digital cameras, speakers and display        screens. A peripheral device may be directly connected to a        single computing device or may be connected to a communication        system through which it can communicate with one or more        computing devices. A storage device that is (i) not included in        or directly connected to a single computing device, and (ii)        accessible by multiple computing devices, is a peripheral        device.    -   c. “network” or “computing network”—A collection of computing        devices and peripheral devices which are all connected to common        communication means that allow direct communication between any        two of the devices without requiring passing the communicated        data through a third device. The network includes both the        connected devices and the communication means. A network may be        wired or wireless or partially wired and partially wireless.    -   d. “networked system” or “networked computing system”—One or        more networks that are interconnected so that communication is        possible between any two devices of the one or more networks,        even if they do not belong to the same network. The connection        between different networks of the networked system may be        achieved through dedicated computing devices, and/or through        computing devices that belong to multiple networks of the        networked system and also have other functionality in addition        to connecting between networks. The networked system includes        the one or more networks, any connecting computing devices and        also peripheral devices accessible by any computing device of        the networked system. Note that a single network is a networked        system having only one network, and therefore a network is a        special case of a networked system.    -   e. “module”—A portion of a system that implements a specific        task. A module may be composed of hardware, software or any        combination of both. For example, in a module composed of both        hardware and software, the hardware may include a portion of a        computing device, a single computing device or multiple        computing devices, and the software may include software code        executed by the portion of the computing device, by the single        computing device or by the multiple computing devices. A        computing device associated with a module may include one or        more processors and computer readable storage medium        (non-transitory, transitory or a combination of both) for        storing instructions or for executing instructions by the one or        more processors.    -   f. “network node of a networked system” or “node of a networked        system”—Any computing device or peripheral device that belongs        to the networked system.    -   g. “security vulnerability of a network node” or “vulnerability        of a network node”—A weakness which allows an attacker to        compromise the network node. A vulnerability of a network node        may be caused by one or more of a flawed configuration of a        component of the network node, a flawed setting of a software        module in the network node, a bug in a software module in the        network node, a human error while operating the network node,        having trust in an already-compromised other network node, and        the like.        -   A weakness that allows an attacker to compromise a network            node only conditionally, depending on current conditions in            the network node or in the networked system in which the            network node resides, is still a vulnerability of the            network node, but may also be referred to as a “potential            vulnerability of the network node”. For example, a            vulnerability that compromises any network node running the            Windows 7 Operating System, but only if the network node            receives messages through a certain Internet port, can be            said to be a vulnerability of any Windows 7 network node,            and can also be said to be a potential vulnerability of any            such node. Note that in this example the potential            vulnerability may fail in compromising the node either            because the certain port is not open (a condition in the            node) or because a firewall is blocking messages from            reaching the certain port in the node (a condition of the            networked system).    -   h. “security vulnerability of a networked system” or        “vulnerability of a networked system”—A weakness which allows an        attacker to compromise the networked system. A vulnerability of        a networked system may be caused by one or more of a        vulnerability of a network node of the networked system, a        flawed configuration of a component of the networked system, a        flawed setting of a software module in the networked system, a        bug in a software module in the networked system, a human error        while operating the networked system, and the like.        -   A weakness that allows an attacker to compromise a networked            system only conditionally, depending on current conditions            in the networked system, is still a vulnerability of the            networked system, but may also be referred to as a            “potential vulnerability of the networked system”. For            example, if a network node of the networked has a potential            vulnerability then that vulnerability can be said to be a            vulnerability of the networked system, and can also be said            to be a potential vulnerability of the networked system.    -   i. “vulnerability management”—A cyclical practice of        identifying, classifying, remediating, and mitigating        vulnerabilities of network nodes in a networked system.    -   j. “penetration testing” or “pen testing” (in some references        also known as “red team assessment” or “red team testing”, but        in other references those terms referring to a red team have a        different meaning than “penetration testing”)—A process in which        a networked system is evaluated in order to determine if it can        be compromised by an attacker by utilizing one or more security        vulnerabilities of the networked system. If it is determined        that the networked system can be compromised, then the one or        more security vulnerabilities of the networked system are        identified and reported.        -   Unlike a vulnerability management process, which operates at            the level of isolated vulnerabilities of individual network            nodes, a penetration test may operate at a higher level            which considers vulnerabilities of multiple network nodes            that might be jointly used by an attacker to compromise the            networked system.        -   A penetration testing process involves at least the            following functions: (i) a reconnaissance function, (ii) an            attack function, and (iii) a reporting function. It should            be noted that the above functions do not necessarily operate            sequentially according to the above order, but may operate            in parallel or in an interleaved mode.        -   Unless otherwise explicitly specified, a reference to            penetration testing should be understood as referring to            automated penetration testing.    -   k. “automated penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which        at least one of the reconnaissance function, the attack function        and the reporting function is at least partially automated.    -   l. “penetration testing system”—A system capable of performing        penetration testing, regardless if composed of hardware,        software or combination of both.    -   m. “reconnaissance function” or “recon function”—The function in        a penetration testing process that handles collection of data        about the tested networked system.        -   The collected data may include internal data of one or more            network nodes of the tested networked system. Additionally,            the collected data may include data about communication            means of the tested networked system and about peripheral            devices of the tested networked system. The collected data            may also include data that is only indirectly related to the            tested networked system, for example business intelligence            data about the organization owning the tested networked            system, collected in order to use it for assessing            importance of resources of the networked system.        -   The functionality of a reconnaissance function may be            implemented by any combination of (i) software executing in            a remote computing device, where the remote computing device            may probe the tested networked system for the purpose of            collecting data about it, (ii) hardware and/or software            simulating or duplicating the tested networked system, (iii)            a reconnaissance agent software module executing in one or            more network nodes of the tested networked system.    -   n. “attack function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles determination of whether one or more        security vulnerabilities exist in the tested networked system.        The determination is based on data collected by the        reconnaissance function of the penetration testing. The attack        function generates data about each of the identified security        vulnerabilities, if any.        -   The functionality of an attack function may be implemented            by any combination of (i) software executing in a remote            computing device, where the remote computing device may            attack the tested networked system for the purpose of            verifying that it can be compromised, (ii) hardware and/or            software simulating or duplicating the tested networked            system, (iii) an attack agent software module executing in            one or more network nodes of the tested networked system.        -   The methods used by an attack function may include executing            a real attack on the tested networked system by attempting            to change at least one setting, mode or state of a network            node or of a hardware or software component of a network            node, in order to verify that the tested networked system            may be compromised. In such case, the attempt may result in            actually compromising the tested networked system.            Alternatively, the methods used by an attack function may be            such that whenever there is a need to verify whether a            setting, a mode or a state of a network node or of a            hardware or software component of a network node can be            changed in a way that compromises the tested networked            system, the verification is done by simulating the effects            of the change or by otherwise evaluating them without ever            actually compromising the tested networked system.    -   o. “reporting function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles reporting of results of the penetration        testing. The reporting comprises at least one of (i) causing a        display device to display a report including information about        the results of the penetration testing, (ii) recording a report        including information about the results of the penetration        testing in a file, and (iii) electronically transmitting a        report including information about the results of the        penetration testing.        -   The functionality of a reporting function may be implemented            by software executing in a remote computing device, for            example in the computing device implementing the attack            function of the penetration testing.    -   p. “recovery function” or “clean-up function”—The function in a        penetration testing process that handles cleaning-up after a        penetration test. The recovery includes undoing any operation        done during the penetration testing process that results in        compromising the tested networked system.        -   The functionality of a recovery function may be implemented            by any combination of (i) software executing in a remote            computing device, for example in the computing device            implementing the attack function of the penetration            testing, (ii) an attack agent software module executing in            one or more network nodes of the tested networked system.    -   q. “a campaign of penetration testing” or “penetration testing        campaign”—A specific run of a specific test of a specific        networked system by the penetration testing system.    -   r. “results of a penetration testing campaign”—Any output        generated by the penetration testing campaign. This includes,        among other things, data about any security vulnerability of the        networked system tested by the penetration testing campaign that        is detected by the campaign. It should be noted that in this        context the word “results” is used in its plural form regardless        of the amount of output data generated by the penetration        testing campaign, including when the output consists of data        about a single security vulnerability.    -   s. “information item of a campaign”—A variable data item that a        penetration testing system must know its value before executing        the campaign. Note that a data item must be able to have        different values at different campaigns in order to be        considered an information item of the campaign. If a data item        always has the same value for all campaigns, it is not an        information item of the campaign, even if it must be known and        is being used by the penetration testing system when executing        the campaign.        -   An information item of a campaign is either a primary            information item of the campaign or a secondary information            item of the campaign.        -   A type of an attacker and a goal of an attacker are examples            of information items of a campaign. Another example of an            information item of a campaign that is more complex than the            previous two simple examples is a subset of the network            nodes of the networked system that is assumed to be already            compromised at the time of beginning the penetration testing            campaign, with the subset defined either by an explicit            selection of network nodes or by a Boolean condition each            node of the subset has to satisfy.        -   A value of an information item may be composed either of a            simple value or of both a main value and one or more            auxiliary values. If a specific main value of an information            item requires one or more auxiliary values that complete the            full characterization of the value, then the combination of            the main value and the one or more auxiliary values together            is considered to be the value assigned to the information            item. For example, for a “goal of the attacker” information            item, after a user selects a main value of “exporting a            specific file from whatever node having a copy of it”, the            user still has to provide a file name as an auxiliary value            in order for the goal information item to be fully            characterized. In this case the combination of “exporting a            specific file from whatever node having a copy of it” and            the specific file name is considered to be the value of the            “goal of the attacker” information item.    -   t. “primary information item of a campaign”—An information item        of the campaign which is completely independent of previously        selected values of other information items of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a primary information item of the campaign are not        dependent on any value previously selected for any another        information item of the campaign. For example, the options        available to the user for selecting a goal of the attacker are        independent of values previously selected for any other        information item of the campaign, and therefore the goal of the        attacker is a primary information item of the campaign.    -   u. “secondary information item of a campaign”—An information        item of the campaign which depends on at least one previously        selected value of another information item of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a secondary information item of the campaign depend on        at least one value previously selected for another information        item of the campaign. For example, the options available to the        user for selecting a capability of an attacker may depend on the        previously selected value of the type of the attacker. For a        first type of attacker the available capabilities to select from        may be a first group of capabilities, while for a second type of        attacker the available capabilities to select from may be a        second group of capabilities, different from the first group.        Therefore, a capability of the attacker is a secondary        information item of the campaign.    -   v. “specifications of a campaign” or “scenario”—A collection of        values assigned to all information items of the campaign. As        having a value for each information item of a campaign is        essential for running it, a campaign of a penetration testing        system cannot be run without providing the penetration testing        system with full specifications of the campaign. A value of an        information item included in the specifications of a campaign        may be manually selected by a user or may be automatically        determined by the penetration testing system. In the latter        case, the automatic determination by the system may depend on        one or more values selected by the user for one or more        information items of the campaign, or it may be independent of        any selection by the user. For example, the selection of the        capabilities of the attacker may automatically be determined by        the system based on the user-selected type of the attacker, and        the lateral movement strategy of the attacker may be        automatically determined by the system independently of any user        selection.    -   w. “pre-defined scenario”, “scenario template” or “template        scenario”—A scenario that exists in storage accessible to a        penetration testing system before the time a campaign is        started, and can be selected by a user of the penetration        testing system for defining a campaign of penetration testing.        -   A pre-defined scenario may be created and provided by the            provider of the penetration testing system and may be part            of a library of multiple pre-defined scenarios.            Alternatively, a pre-defined scenario may be created by the            user of the penetration testing system using a scenario            editor provided by the provider of the penetration testing            system.        -   A penetration testing system may require that a campaign of            penetration testing that is based on a pre-defined scenario            must have all its values of information items taken from the            pre-defined scenario, with no exceptions. Alternatively, a            penetration testing system may allow a user to select a            pre-defined scenario and then override and change one or            more values of information items of a campaign that is based            on the pre-defined scenario.    -   x. “attacker” or “threat actor”—An entity, whether a single        person, a group of persons or an organization, that might        conduct an attack against a networked system by penetrating it        for uncovering its security vulnerabilities and/or for        compromising it.    -   y. “a type of an attacker”—A classification of the attacker that        indicates its main incentive in conducting attacks of networked        systems. Typical values for a type of an attacker are        state-sponsored, opportunistic cyber criminal, organized cyber        criminal and insider.        -   An attacker can have only a single type.    -   z. “a capability of an attacker”—A tool in the toolbox of the        attacker. A capability describes a specific action that the        attacker can perform. Examples of capabilities are copying a        local file of a network node and exporting it to the attacker        out of the networked system and remotely collecting database        information from an SQL server of the networked system. In some        systems, selecting a type of an attacker causes a corresponding        default selection of capabilities for that type of attacker, but        the user may have an option to override the default selection        and add or delete capabilities.        -   An attacker can have one or multiple capabilities.    -   aa. “a method of a capability”—A combination of (i) an algorithm        for implementing the capability, and (ii) a required condition        for the capability to be applicable and feasible for an attacker        having that capability. For example, an opportunistic        cyber-criminal may have the knowledge of forcing RCE (Remote        Code Execution) in a browser of a targeted network node using a        simple and well-known algorithm, but that algorithm is only        applicable when the browser is an old version of IF (Internet        Explorer) not higher than a specific version number. On the        other hand, a state-sponsored attacker may have the knowledge of        forcing RCE using a complex and sophisticated algorithm, that        algorithm being applicable to every type of browser and every        version of it. The two attackers both have the same capability        of forcing RCE for browsers, but have different methods for that        capability—for one attacker the RCE capability is implemented by        a first method which is limited to a certain subclass of        browsers, while for the other attacker the RCE capability is        implemented by a second method which is applicable to all        browsers.        -   The condition of a method may be the trivial condition that            is always satisfied, as is demonstrated in the above example            in which a state-sponsored attacker has an RCE capability            with an always-true condition.        -   A capability can have one or multiple methods.    -   bb. “a trait of an attacker”—A behavioral and non-technical        feature of the attacker that may affect how he conducts his        attack. A trait may be a condition controlling the conducting of        the attack by the attacker. An example of a trait of an attacker        is the sensitivity of the attacker to detection (a.k.a. the        aggression level of the attacker). A state-sponsored attacker        may be assumed to only use his capabilities if the attack can be        hidden and remain undetected by the organization owning the        attacked networked system. On the other hand, an opportunistic        cyber criminal that has the same capabilities and methods may be        assumed to completely ignore considerations of being detected or        not. The two attackers have the same capabilities and methods,        but different values for the sensitivity to detection trait,        that control their operation during the attack. Alternatively, a        trait may have several (more than two) discrete possible values.        For example, the sensitivity to detection trait described above,        may be assigned any one of the values “highly sensitive”,        “moderately sensitive” and “not sensitive”. Alternatively, a        trait may have a value selectable from a continuous scale, for        example from the range [0 . . . 100].        -   An attacker can have one or multiple traits.    -   cc. “a level of sensitivity to detection of an attacker” or “an        aggression level of an attacker”—The extent to which the        attacker prefers not to be detected while carrying out his        attack. A high level of sensitivity to detection or a high        aggression level indicate a strong preference for not being        detected. A low level of sensitivity to detection or low        aggression level indicate weak preference for not being        detected. The sensitivity/aggression level may be specified as        one of two possible values (e.g. “sensitive” vs. “not        sensitive”). Alternatively, the sensitivity/aggression level may        be specified as one of several (more than two) discrete possible        values (e.g. “highly sensitive”, “moderately sensitive”,        “moderately not sensitive”, “highly not sensitive”).        Alternatively, the sensitivity/aggression level may be specified        as a value selectable from a continuous scale (e.g. from the        range [0 . . . 10]).    -   dd. “a goal of an attacker”—What the attacker of a campaign is        trying to achieve when attacking a targeted networked system. In        other words, what is the criterion according to which it will be        judged whether the attack was a success or a failure and/or to        what extent was it a success or a failure. Selecting a type of        an attacker may cause a default selection of a goal for that        attacker, but the user may have an option to override the        default selection. An attacker can have one or multiple goals.    -   ee. “a lateral movement strategy of an attacker”—A decision        logic applied by the attacker of a campaign for selecting the        next network node to try to compromise. During a penetration        testing campaign, the attacker is assumed to make progress by an        iterative process in which in each iteration he selects the next        node to attack, based on the group of network nodes he already        controls (i.e. that are already compromised). If the attack on        the selected node is successful, that node is added to the group        of nodes that are already compromised, and another iteration        starts. If the attempt to compromise the selected node fails,        another node is selected, either according to some other rule or        randomly.        -   It should be noted that all types of penetration testing            systems, whether using simulated penetration testing, actual            attack penetration testing or some other form of penetration            testing, must use a lateral movement strategy. In the case            of a penetration testing system that actually attacks the            tested networked system, the lateral movement strategy            selects the path of attack actually taken through the            networked system. In the case of a penetration testing            system that simulates or evaluates the results of attacking            the tested networked system, the lateral movement strategy            selects the path of attack taken in the simulation or the            evaluation through the networked system. Therefore in the            above explanation, the term “attack” should be understood to            mean “actual attack or simulated attack”, the term “already            controls” should be understood to mean “already controls or            already determined to be able to control”, the term “already            compromised” should be understood to mean “already            compromised or already determined to be compromisable”, etc.        -   A simple example of a lateral movement strategy is a “depth            first” strategy. In such strategy, the next network node to            try to compromise is an immediate neighbor of the last            network node that was compromised that is not yet            compromised (provided such neighbor node exists). Two            network nodes are “immediate neighbors” of each other if and            only if they have a direct communication link between them            that does not pass through any other network node.        -   Another simple example is a “breadth search” strategy. In            such strategy, the next network node to try to compromise is            a network node whose distance from the first node            compromised by the campaign is the smallest possible. The            distance between two network nodes is the number of network            nodes along the shortest path between them, plus one. A path            is an ordered list of network nodes in which each pair of            adjacent nodes in the list is a pair of immediate neighbors.            Thus, the distance between two immediate neighbors is one.        -   An example of a more advanced lateral movement strategy is a            strategy that is applicable when a goal of the attacker is            related to a resource of the networked system that resides            in a specific network node. In such case the next network            node to try to compromise may be selected by determining the            shortest path in the networked system leading from an            already compromised node to the specific node containing the            desired resource, and picking the first node on this path to            be the next node to try to compromise. Note that if the            shortest path has a length of one (which happens when the            specific node is an immediate neighbor of an already            compromised node), then the next node to try to compromise            is the specific node containing the desired resource.            Another example of a lateral movement strategy is a strategy            that gives priority to network nodes satisfying a specific            condition, for example nodes that are known to have a            specific weakness, such as running the Windows XP operating            system. In such case the next node to try to compromise is a            node that satisfies the condition and is also an immediate            neighbor of an already compromised node (if such node            exists). Selecting a type of an attacker may cause a default            selection of a lateral movement strategy for that attacker,            but the user may have an option to override the default            selection. An attacker can only have a single lateral            movement strategy.    -   ff. “penetration testing by simulation” or “simulated        penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which (i) the        functionality of the reconnaissance function is fully        implemented by software executing by a remote computing device        and/or by hardware and/or software simulating or duplicating the        tested networked system, where the remote computing device may        probe the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting        data about it, as long as this is done without risking        compromising the tested networked system, and (ii) the methods        used by the attack function are such that whenever there is a        need to verify whether a setting, a mode or a state of a network        node or of a hardware or software component of a network node        can be changed in a way that compromises the tested networked        system, the verification is done by simulating the effects of        the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   gg. “penetration testing by actual attack” or “actual attack        penetration testing” or “penetration testing by actual exploit”        or “actual exploit penetration testing”—Penetration testing in        which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        fully implemented by (A) software executing in a remote        computing device, where the remote computing device may probe        the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting data        about it even if this risks compromising the tested networked        system, and/or by (B) software executing in one or more network        nodes of the tested networked system that analyzes network        traffic and network packets of the tested networked system for        collecting data about it, and (ii) the methods used by the        attack function include executing a real attack on the tested        networked system by attempting to change at least one setting,        mode or state of a network node or of a hardware or software        component of a network node in order to verify that the tested        networked system may be compromised, such that the attempt may        result in compromising the tested networked system.    -   hh. “penetration testing by reconnaissance agents” or        “reconnaissance agent penetration testing”—Penetration testing        in which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        at least partially implemented by a reconnaissance agent        software module installed and executed in each one of multiple        network nodes of the tested networked system, where the data        collected by at least one instance of the reconnaissance agent        software module includes internal data of the network node in        which it is installed, and the data collected by at least one        instance of the reconnaissance agent software module is at least        partially collected during the penetration testing process,        and (ii) the methods used by the attack function are such that        whenever there is a need to verify whether a setting, a mode or        a state of a network node or of a hardware or software component        of a network node can be changed in a way that compromises the        tested networked system, this is done by simulating the effects        of the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   ii. “reconnaissance client agent”, “reconnaissance agent” or        “recon agent”—A software module that can be installed on a        network node and can be executed by a processor of that network        node for partially or fully implementing the reconnaissance        function of a penetration test. A reconnaissance agent must be        capable, when executed by a processor of the network node in        which it is installed, of collecting data at least about some of        the events occurring in the network node. Such events may be        internal events of the network node or messages sent out of the        network node or received by the network node. A reconnaissance        agent may be capable of collecting data about all types of        internal events of its hosting network node. Additionally, it        may be capable of collecting other types of data of its hosting        network node. A reconnaissance agent may additionally be capable        of collecting data about other network nodes or about other        components of a networked system containing the hosting network        node. A reconnaissance agent may be persistently installed on a        network node, where “persistently” means that once installed on        a network node the reconnaissance agent survives a reboot of the        network node. Alternatively, a reconnaissance agent may be        non-persistently installed on a network node, where        “non-persistently” means that the reconnaissance agent does not        survive a reboot of the network node and consequently should be        installed again on the network node for a new penetration test        in which the network node takes part, if the network node was        rebooted since the previous penetration test in which it took        part.    -   jj. “attack client agent” or “attack agent”—A software module        that can be installed on a network node and can be executed by a        processor of that network node for partially or fully        implementing the attack function of a penetration test.        Typically, an attack agent is installed by an actual attack        penetration testing system in a network node that it had        succeeded to compromise during a penetration test. Once        installed on such network node, the attack agent may be used as        a tool for compromising other network nodes in the same        networked system. In such case, the attack agent may include        code that when executed by a processor of the compromised        network node compromises another network node that is adjacent        to it in the networked system, possibly taking advantage of the        high level of trust it may have from the point of view of the        adjacent network node. Another type of an attack agent may        include code that when executed by a processor of a network node        determines whether that network node would be compromised if a        given operation is performed.    -   kk. “penetration testing software module” or “remote computing        device penetration testing software module”—A software module        that implements the full functionality of a penetration testing        system, except for the functionality implemented by (i)        reconnaissance agents, (ii) attack agents, and (iii) hardware        and/or software simulating or duplicating the tested networked        system, if such components are used in the implementation of the        penetration testing system.        -   The penetration testing software module may be installed and            executed on a single computing device or comprise multiple            software components that reside on multiple computing            devices. For example, a first component of the penetration            testing software module may implement part or all of the            reconnaissance function and be installed and executed on a            first computing device, a second component of the            penetration testing software module may implement part or            all of the attack function and be installed and executed on            a second computing device, and a third component of the            penetration testing software module may implement the            reporting function and be installed and executed on a third            computing device.    -   ll. “internal data of a network node”—Data related to the        network node that is only directly accessible to code executing        by a processor of the network node and is only accessible to any        code executing outside of the network node by receiving it from        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        internal data of a network node are data about internal events        of the network node, data about internal conditions of the        network node, and internal factual data of the network node.    -   mm. “internal event of/in a network node”—An event occurring in        the network node whose occurrence is only directly detectable by        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        an internal event of a network node are an insertion of a USB        drive into a port of the network node, and a removal of a USB        drive from a port of the network node. An internal event may be        a free event or a non-free event.        -   It should be noted that the term “an event of X” refers to            any occurrence of an event of the type X and not to a            specific occurrence of it. For referring to a specific            occurrence of an event of type X one should explicitly say            “an occurrence of event of X”. Thus, a software module which            looks for detecting insertions of a USB drive into a port is            “detecting an event of USB drive insertion”, while after            that module had detected such event it may report “an            occurrence of an event of USB drive insertion”.    -   nn. “internal condition of/in a network node”—A Boolean        condition related to the network node which can only be directly        tested by code executing by a processor of the network node.        Examples of an internal condition of a network node are whether        the local disk of the terminal node is more than 98% full or        not, and whether a USB drive is currently inserted in a port of        the network node.    -   oo. “internal factual data of/in a network node” or “internal        facts of a network node”—Facts related to the network node which        can only be directly found by code executing by a processor of        the network node. Examples of factual data of a network node are        the version of the firmware of a solid-state drive installed in        the network node, the hardware version of a processor of the        network node, and the amount of free space in a local disk of        the network node.    -   pp. “resource of a networked system”—A file in a network node of        the networked system, a folder in a network node of the        networked system, credentials of a user of the networked system,        a peripheral device of a network node of the networked system,        or a peripheral device directly attached to a network of the        networked system.    -   qq. “compromising a network node”—Successfully causing execution        of an operation in the network node that is not allowed for the        entity requesting the operation by the rules defined by an        administrator of the network node, or successfully causing        execution of code in a software module of the network node that        was not predicted by the vendor of the software module. Examples        for compromising a network node are reading a file without        having read permission for it, modifying a file without having        write permission for it, deleting a file without having delete        permission for it, exporting a file out of the network node        without having permission to do so, getting an access right        higher than the one originally assigned without having        permission to get it, getting a priority higher than the one        originally assigned without having permission to get it,        changing a configuration of a firewall network node such that it        allows access to other network nodes that were previously hidden        behind the firewall without having permission to do it, and        causing execution of software code by utilizing a buffer        overflow. As shown by the firewall example, the effects of        compromising a certain network node are not necessarily limited        to that certain network node. In addition, executing successful        ARP spoofing, denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle or        session-hijacking attacks against a network node are also        considered compromising that network node, even if not        satisfying any of the conditions listed above in this        definition.    -   rr. “compromising a networked system” Compromising at least one        network node of the networked system or successfully causing        execution of an operation in the networked system that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the networked system. Examples        for operations in the networked system that may not be allowed        are exporting a file out of the networked system without having        permission to do so, sending a file to a network printer without        having permission to do so, and copying a file from one network        node to another network node without having permission to do so.    -   ss. “compromising a software application”—Successfully causing        the software application to execute an operation that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the network node on which the        software application is installed or by a vendor of the software        application, or successfully causing the execution of code in        the software application that was not predicted by the vendor of        the software application. Examples for compromising a software        application are changing a configuration file controlling the        operation of the software application without having permission        for doing so, and activating a privileged function of the        software application without having permission for doing so. In        addition, causing the software application to execute a macro        without checking rights of the macro code to do what it is        attempting to do is also considered compromising that software        application, even if not satisfying any of the conditions listed        above in this definition.    -   tt. “administrator of a network node”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the network node.    -   uu. “administrator of a networked system”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the networked system. Note        that an administrator of a networked system may also be an        administrator of one or more of the network nodes of the        networked system.    -   vv. “remote computing device” (with respect to a given networked        system)—A computing device that executes software implementing        part or all of the penetration testing software module that is        used for testing the given networked system.        -   A remote computing device may be (i) outside of the given            networked system, or (ii) inside the given networked system.            In other words, a remote computing device is not necessarily            physically remote from the given networked system. It is            called “remote” to indicate its functionality is logically            separate from the functionality of the given networked            system.        -   A remote computing device may (i) be a dedicated computing            device that is dedicated only to doing penetration testing,            or (ii) also implement other functionality not directly            related to penetration testing.        -   A remote computing device is not limited to be a single            physical device with a single processing unit. It may be            implemented by multiple separate physical devices packaged            in separate packages that may be located at different            locations. Each of the separate physical devices may include            one or multiple processing units.        -   A remote computing device may be (i) a physical computing            device, or (ii) a virtual machine running inside a physical            computing device on top of a hosting operating system.    -   ww, “explicitly selecting”—Directly and clearly selecting, by a        human user, of one option out of multiple options available to        the human user, leaving no room for doubt and not relying on        making deductions by a computing device.        -   Examples of explicit selections are (i) selection of a            specific type of an attacker from a drop-down list of            types, (ii) selection of specific one or more attacker            capabilities by marking one or more check boxes in a group            of multiple check boxes corresponding to multiple attacker            capabilities, and (iii) reception for viewing by a user of a            recommendation automatically computed by a computing device            for a value of an information item and actively approving by            the user of the recommendation for using the value, provided            that the approving user has an option of rejecting the            recommendation and selecting a different value for the            information item.        -   Examples of selections that are not explicit selections            are (i) selection of specific one or more attacker            capabilities by selecting a specific scenario of a            penetration testing system from a pre-defined library of            scenarios, where the specific scenario includes an attacker            having the one or more capabilities, and (ii) selection of            specific one or more attacker capabilities by selecting a            specific goal of an attacker, accompanied by a deduction by            a computing device concluding that the specific one or more            attacker capabilities must be selected because they are            essential for the attacker to succeed in meeting the            specific goal.    -   xx. “automatically selecting”—Selecting, by a computing device,        of one option out of multiple options, without receiving from a        human user an explicit selection of the selected option. It        should be noted that the selecting of an option is an automatic        selecting even if the computing device is basing the selection        on one or more explicit selections by the user, as long as the        selected option itself is not explicitly selected by the user.        It should also be noted that receiving from a user of an        approval for a recommendation which is otherwise automatically        selected without giving the user an ability to override the        recommendation does not make the selection a non-automatic        selection.        -   An example of an automatic selection is a selection by a            computing device of one or more attacker capabilities by (a)            receiving from a user an explicit selection of a specific            scenario of a penetration testing system from a pre-defined            library of scenarios, (b) determining by the computing            device that the specific scenario includes an attacker            having the one or more capabilities, and (c) deducing by the            computing device that the user wants to select the one or            more attacker capabilities.        -   An example of a selection that is not an automatic selection            is a selection of a value for an information item by (a)            calculating by a computing device of a recommended value for            the information item, (b) displaying the recommendation to a            user, and (c) receiving from the user an explicit approval            to use the recommended value of the information item,            provided that the approving user has an option of rejecting            the recommendation and selecting a different value for the            information item.    -   yy. “defensive application”—A software application whose task is        to defend the network node in which it is installed against        potential attackers. A defensive application may be a passive        defensive application, in which case it only detects and reports        penetration attempts into its hosting network node but does not        attempt to defend against the detected attacks. Alternatively, a        defensive application may be an active defensive application, in        which case it not only detects penetration attempts into its        hosting network node but also attempts to defend its hosting        node against the detected attacks by activating at least one        counter-measure.    -   zz. “user interface”—A man-machine interface that does at least        one of (i) providing information to a user, and (ii) receiving        input from the user. Towards this end, any user interface        includes at least one of (i) an input device (e.g. touch-screen,        mouse, keyboard, joystick, camera) for receiving input from the        user, and (ii) an output device (e.g. display screen such as a        touch-screen, speaker) for providing information to the user. A        user interface typically also includes executable user-interface        code for at least one of (i) causing the output device to        provide information to the user (e.g. to display text associated        with radio-buttons or with a check list, or text of a drop-down        list) and (ii) processing user-input received via the input        device.        -   In different examples, the executable code may be            compiled-code (e.g. in assembly or machine-language),            interpreted byte-code (e.g. Java byte-code), or            browser-executed code (e.g. JavaScript code) that may be            sent to a client device from a remote server and then            executed by the client device.    -   aaa. “user interface of a computing device”—A user interface        that is functionally attached to the computing device and serves        the computing device for interacting with the user.        -   An input device of a user interface of a computing device            may share a common housing with the computing device (e.g. a            touch-screen of a tablet), or may be physically separate            from the computing device and be in communication with it,            either through a physical port (e.g. a USB port) or            wirelessly (e.g. a wireless mouse).        -   An output device of a user interface of a computing device            may share a common housing with the computing device (e.g. a            touch-screen of a tablet), or may be physically separate            from the computing device and be in communication with it,            either through a physical port (e.g. an HDMI port) or            wirelessly.        -   User-interface code of a user interface of a computing            device is stored in a memory accessible to the computing            device and is executed by one or more processors of the            computing device. In one example related to web-based user            interfaces, at least some of this code may be received from            a remote server and then locally executed by the computing            device which functions as a client. In another example            related to locally-implemented user interfaces, all of the            user-interface code is pre-loaded onto the computing device.    -   bbb. “or”—A logical operator combining two Boolean input        conditions into a Boolean compound condition, such that the        compound condition is satisfied if and only if at least one of        the two input conditions is satisfied. In other words, if        condition C=condition A or condition B, then condition C is not        satisfied when both condition A and condition B are not        satisfied, but is satisfied in each of the following cases: (i)        condition A is satisfied and condition B is not satisfied, (ii)        condition A is not satisfied and condition B is satisfied,        and (iii) both condition A and condition B are satisfied.    -   ccc. “random selection”—A selection that depends on a random or        pseudo-random factor. Different possible outcomes in a random        selection do not necessarily have the same probabilities of        being selected.    -   ddd. “subset/subgroup of a given set/group” or        “sub-set/sub-group of a given set/group”—A set/group that        satisfies the condition that that every member of it is also a        member of the given set/group. Unless otherwise stated, a        subset/subgroup may be empty and contain no members at all.        Unless otherwise stated, a subset/subgroup of a given set/group        may contain all the members of the given set/group and be equal        to the given set/group.    -   eee. “proper subset/subgroup of a given set/group” or “proper        sub-set/sub-group of a given set/group”—A subset/subgroup of the        given set/group that is not equal to the given set/group. In        other words, there is at least one member of the given set/group        that is not a member of the subset/subgroup.

It will be appreciated that certain features of the invention, whichare, for clarity, described in the context of separate embodiments, mayalso be provided in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely,various features of the invention, which are, for brevity, described inthe context of a single embodiment, may also be provided separately orin any suitable sub-combination.

Although the invention has been described in conjunction with specificembodiments thereof, it is evident that many alternatives, modificationsand variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art.Accordingly, it is intended to embrace all such alternatives,modifications and variations that fall within the spirit and broad scopeof the appended claims. All publications, patents and patentapplications mentioned in this specification are herein incorporated intheir entirety by reference into the specification, to the same extentas if each individual publication, patent or patent application wasspecifically and individually indicated to be incorporated herein byreference. In addition, citation or identification of any reference inthis application shall not be construed as an admission that suchreference is available as prior art to the present invention.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system that is controlled by auser interface of a computing device so that a penetration testingcampaign is executed according to a lateral movement strategy of anattacker of the penetration testing campaign, the method comprising: a.automatically selecting, by the penetration testing system, one lateralmovement strategy from a group of multiple lateral movement strategiesavailable for use in the penetration testing campaign; wherein theautomatic selecting is done by randomly selecting the one lateralmovement strategy from the group of lateral movement strategies; b.executing the penetration testing campaign, by the penetration testingsystem and according to the automatically selected lateral movementstrategy of the attacker, so as to test the networked system; and c.reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system by theexecuting of the penetration testing campaign, wherein the reportingcomprises at least one of (i) causing a display device to display areport describing the at least one security vulnerability, (ii) storingthe report describing the at least one security vulnerability in a file,and (iii) electronically transmitting the report describing the at leastone security vulnerability.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein theexecuting of the penetration testing campaign includes at least oneevent of selecting, according to the automatically selected one lateralmovement strategy, a network node of the networked system to be the nextnetwork node to be attacked by the attacker of the penetration testingcampaign.
 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: prior to theautomatically selecting, receiving, by the penetration testing systemand via the user interface of the computing device, one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to make the automatic selection randomly.
 4. The method of claim1, further comprising, prior to the automatically selecting,determining, by the penetration testing system, the group of multiplelateral movement strategies that are available for use in thepenetration testing campaign.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein thedetermining of the group of multiple lateral movement strategiescomprises retrieving the group of multiple lateral movement strategiesfrom a non-volatile storage device functionally accessible to thepenetration testing system.
 6. The method of claim 4, wherein thedetermining of the group of multiple lateral movement strategiescomprises: a. displaying, by the penetration testing system, a secondgroup of multiple lateral movement strategies, the second group ofmultiple lateral movement strategies including the lateral movementstrategies in the group of multiple lateral movement strategies; b.receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the user interfaceof the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs explicitlyselecting a sub-group of the second group of multiple lateral movementstrategies; c. defining the group of multiple lateral movementstrategies from which the one lateral movement strategy is automaticallyselected to be the selected sub-group.
 7. A system for penetrationtesting of a networked system by performing a penetration testingcampaign against the networked system, the system comprising: a. aset-up module including: i. one or more set-up processors; and ii. aset-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium for instructionsexecution by the one or more set-up processors, the set-upnon-transitory computer readable storage medium having storedinstructions to automatically select one lateral movement strategy of anattacker of the penetration testing campaign from a group of multiplelateral movement strategies available for use in the penetration testingcampaign, the instructions to automatically select includinginstructions to randomly select the one lateral movement strategy fromthe group of lateral movement strategies; b. apenetration-testing-campaign module including: i. one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors; and ii. apenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium for instructions execution by the one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors, thepenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium having stored instructions to perform the penetration testingcampaign according to the automatically selected lateral movementstrategy of the attacker so as to test the networked system; and c. areporting module including: i. one or more reporting processors; and ii.a reporting non-transitory computer readable storage medium forinstructions execution by the one or more reporting processors, thereporting non-transitory computer readable storage medium having storedinstructions to report at least one security vulnerability determined toexist in the networked system according to results of the penetrationtesting campaign performed by the penetration-testing-campaign module,the instructions to report including at least one of (i) instructions tocause a display device to display a report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability, (ii) instructions to store the report describingthe at least one security vulnerability in a file and (iii) instructionsto electronically transmit the report describing the at least onesecurity vulnerability.
 8. The system of claim 7, wherein theinstructions to perform the penetration testing campaign includeinstructions to select, according to the automatically selected onelateral movement strategy, a network node of the networked system to bethe next network node to be attacked by the attacker of the penetrationtesting campaign.
 9. The system of claim 7, wherein the set-upnon-transitory computer readable storage medium further includes storedinstructions, to be carried out prior to carrying out of saidinstructions to automatically select, to receive, via a user interfaceassociated with the set-up module, one or more manually-entered inputsexplicitly instructing the penetration testing system to make theautomatic selection randomly.
 10. The system of claim 7, wherein theset-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium further includesstored instructions, to be carried out prior to carrying out of saidinstructions to automatically select, to determine the group of multiplelateral movement strategies that are available for use in thepenetration testing campaign.
 11. The system of claim 10, wherein theinstructions to determine the group of multiple lateral movementstrategies comprise instructions to retrieve the group of multiplelateral movement strategies from a non-volatile storage devicefunctionally accessible to the set-up module.
 12. The system of claim10, wherein: (i) the set-up module is functionally associated with auser interface, and (ii) the instructions to determine the group ofmultiple lateral movement strategies comprise: a. instructions todisplay, by the set-up module and via the user interface, a second groupof multiple lateral movement strategies, the second group of multiplelateral movement strategies including the lateral movement strategies inthe group of multiple lateral movement strategies; b. instructions toreceive, by the set-up module and via the user interface, one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a sub-group of the secondgroup of multiple lateral movement strategies; and c. instructions todefine the group of multiple lateral movement strategies from which theone lateral movement strategy is automatically selected to be theselected sub-group.